Investigation report of propylene explosion and fire at Formosa's Point Comfort plant

In a lawsuit filed earlier this month, victims of a propylene explosion and fire at the Texas petrochemical plant of Formosa Plastics Corp. contend that Formosa was aware of hazards at the plant and acted with "conscious indifference to the rights, safety or welfare of others." Other allegations include failure on part of Formosa to provide workers with appropriate safety equipment, to implement and enforce an adequate safety program, violation of OSHA standards and allowing vehicles to travel through the plant with no specific routes, restrictions or regard to protruding piping filled with volatile gases. The accident occurred on Oct. 6, 2005, in the Formosa plant's Olefins II unit, which converts either natural gas liquids or naphtha into products such as propylene and ethylene. According CSB, the accident began when a forklift towing a trailer loaded with cylinders of breathing air used in maintenance, snagged a valve, pulling it out of the system. According to the agency, this caused the release of a large volume of propylene - the lawsuit refers to it as a "rapidly expanding, flammable vapor cloud" - which then ignited, creating a large fire. The initial explosion knocked several operators to the ground and burned two men, and fourteen workers sustained minor injuries evacuating the complex. In addition to Formosa Plastics Corp. Texas, the lawsuit names two other defendants: HP Services LP; and Fernando Rivero, who allegedly was driving the forklift that triggered the accident. CSB's investigation of the accident concluded that Formosa's Olefins II unit was not equipped with automated shutdown valves that could have stopped the propylene flow and limited the size of the fire. Formosa operators were unable to reach manual valves to stop the release due to the presence of the growing vapor cloud. The CSB investigation noted that the valve hit by the trailer was unguarded and vulnerable to being hit by vehicles. The investigation also noted that some steel supports were not fireproofed and, consequently, collapsed, thereby causing the failure of pipes designed to carry flammable hydrocarbons to the unit's flare system, where they could be safely burned in the atmosphere. Without this safety system in place, CSB said, pressurized flammable gases continued to feed the fire, which burned for 5 days. CSB's investigation also determined that flame-resistant clothing was not required for all employee activities within the Olefins II unit, where there were large quantities of flammable liquids and gases.