Safety lapses caused 2005 explosion at Formosa

25-Jul-06

An investigation has concluded that explosions and fires that burned two men and injured 14 others at the Formosa Plastics Point Comfort plant in October 2005 were preventable. The explosions and fires occurred at the plant's Olefins II Unit, which produces ethylene and propylene. As per the safety board, the accident occurred when a forklift towing a trailer loaded with cylinders of breathing air snagged a valve, pulling it out of the system. This caused the release of a large volume of propylene, which then ignited and created a large fire. Had the Olefins II unit been equipped with automated shutoff valves, it would have been possible to stop the propylene flow, limiting the size of the fire. Operators were unable to reach manual valves to stop the release because of the growing vapor cloud. The valve hit by the trailer was unguarded and vulnerable, and that some steel supports were not fireproofed, causing them to collapse. This also caused the failure of pipes, which are designed to carry flammable hydrocarbons to the unit's flare system, where they could be safely burned in the atmosphere. Without this safety system in place, pressurized flammable gases continued to feed the fire, which burned for 5 days. The cause of can be pinned down to unprotected piping, non-fireproofed structures and a lack of automatic shutoff valves, caused by the unit's design engineering firm that used plans that had not been updated to incorporate the latest standards for fireproofing steel structures. Also, the workers were not wearing flame-resistant clothing at the time of the fires and explosions, which would have helped to protect them.